rop development in cisco ios

​ There are some stack overflow vulnerability in cisco IOS system like CVE-2017-6736 and CVE-2018-0171,but there are little exp or analysis for those vulnerability .So it’s hard to develop a rop chain. Recently I develop a CVE-2017-6736 exp for c2600, I want to record the analysis for this.

​ Firstly, we can enable the cisco debug output using debug all command, when we connect the 23 port with telnet, we can see the string AAA/LOCAL: exec, follow the string, we can find the function process aaa auth like this:

​ After some debug, I find that when the call of p_ptr return 1, we can get lv1 shell directly. So the first step for rop is overwrite the p_ptr to a gadget which return 1. Like this:

.text:80008210 loc_80008210:                           # CODE XREF: sub_8000819C+24↑j
.text:80008210                 li        r3, 1
.text:80008214                 blr

Notice: the end of the gadget must be blr , becase the call of powerpc always be bctrl, which set the lr register, so we must choose the instruction that jmp to the lr register.

​ After get lv1 shell, we must get lv15 privilege to control the switch. I notice that when I use enable command and input the wrong password, it will print Bad secrets. So I find the xrefs for it. After some debug ,I find some interesting things:

when the wtf_flag is 0, and the function pointer

off_8234AC7C return 1 , the function can returns 1 then we can get lv15 shell. Then I overwrite those memory and success get the lv15 shell.

​ But there are some tricks for ppc rop develop. Firstly, CVE-2017-6736 can’t overflow much byte, so we can’t overwrite those memory with only one time. After overwrite one address , we must ensure that the snmp server run normally. A good way for this is return to the snmp thread function, it’s easy to find:

​ For gadget choose, there must be the instruction which get return address from stack and set the lr register like this:

.text:805CF304                 stw       r4, 0(r3)
.text:805CF308                 li        r3, 1
.text:805CF30C loc_805CF30C:                           # CODE XREF: sub_805CF2C4+3C↑j
.text:805CF30C                 lwz       r0, 12(r1)
.text:805CF310                 mtlr      r0
.text:805CF314                 addi      r1, r1, 8
.text:805CF318                 blr

the gadget store the r4 register to [r3], and get the return address from 12(r1)( the r1 register is the stack pointer ).

others like this,is useless for rop development:

.text:817D235C                 lwz       r9, 8(r1)
.text:817D2360                 lwz       r0, 0x10(r1)
.text:817D2364                 stw       r0, 0x34(r9)
.text:817D2368                 addi      r1, r1, 0x18
.text:817D236C                 blr

It seems like complete address in one gadget, but we can’t control the lr register , so it while be a endless loop or crash.


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